Rio Gringa

Five Reasons Why "Narcos" Is a Game-Changer

Netflix's "Narcos" has a lot of people talking. Starring the magnificent Brazilian actor Wagner Moura and co-produced and partially directed by Brazilian José Padilha, the show focuses on Colombia but carries an indelible Brazilian imprint. There have been a variety of complaints about the show, but I think it's a great watch and an important jumping-off point for shows and movies about Latin America for a global audience. Here's why.

5. Almost half of it is in Spanish - even if the accents are off.

There's been a lot of complaining about Moura's Brazilian accent in Spanish, and the potpourri of other accents among the Spanish-speaking cast. But the fact that it's in Spanish at all is a huge improvement over many U.S. productions where the cast speaks English, even though they're supposed to be Russian or French or Mexican. There's been hesitation to thrust subtitles on American audiences, but since Netflix is betting on global viewers, it took the risk, and I think it paid off well. I understand how annoying the accent issue must be for Colombians, but a lot of viewers likely didn't notice, especially because Moura is so great (and terrifying).

4. Its docudrama format uses a huge amount of actual events and people, including layers of historic footage.

One of the complaints about the show relates to the mentions of magical realism. I get that it's clichéd, but I think it drives at the idea that truth is often stranger than fiction, and it's in this realm that Padilha - who directed the documentary Bus 174 and the Elite Squad docudramas - thrives. Moral relativism, the blurred line between good and evil, and the intersection of violence and power are all very much part of his wheelhouse, and they're what make "Narcos" so compelling. Padilha favors this format because he seems invested in educating audiences in addition to entertaining them.

For those interested in learning more about Colombia during Escobar's height, The Two Escobars and Sins of My Father are highly recommended.

 

3. "Narcos" addresses American intervention in Latin America in an interesting and nuanced way, and it reminds us that the drug war is truly global.

It's rare to see a blockbuster TV show or movie address American interventionism in Latin America well. One of the best things about "Narcos" is not only using historical facts, but ensuring that the Americans in the story aren't seen as the heroes, sweeping in to aid the "helpless" locals. (This is likely because of the amount of Latin Americans involved in producing and directing the series, another important factor to point out.) Not only do we learn about U.S. involvement in Colombia's drug war, but we also learn about U.S. support of Pinochet in Chile, as well as very relevant issues of torture and surveillance.

 

While the show focuses on Colombia, viewers get a glimpse of how the cocaine trade expanded its global reach. After the show came out, I found out that a man in the neighborhood where I grew up was jailed for running an airline ferrying cocaine from Colombia to the U.S.

2. It drives home the idea that what happened to Colombia could happen in other Latin American countries.

Colombia is uniquely geographically positioned for the cocaine trade to have flourished there: neighboring coca-growing countries, having a climate where coca could grow, and being relatively close to the U.S., among other factors.

But the show's highlight of the fact that Chile was initially a cocaine-trafficking hotspot is a relevant one. Drug trafficking and its funding of organized crime has affected all Latin American countries, and while Colombia is still a major player, ground zero of drug trafficking in the Americas has moved to Mexico and Central America. Watching the show, I can easily imagine spin-offs series in other Latin American countries, even Brazil. Padilha himself reportedly left his home in Rio de Janeiro and moved to Los Angeles after getting fed up with armed violence.

1. The series illustrates what Colombians endured and continue to endure in their daily lives and in forming a national identity.

Colombians are the heroes in this series: not only the leaders who stood up to the traffickers but also the regular people who dealt with the consequences of the drug war. To me, that's one of the strongest elements of the show and one that transcends Hollywood stereotypes.

I think it also helps global audiences understand why the drug war has affected Colombians' view of themselves and the shame and trauma they feel having lived through the worst of the violence. It's hard to be a Colombian abroad because of the stigma attached to the drug war, meaning Colombians have faced more stringent visa requirements and humiliations when crossing borders. There's a powerful moment in the series featuring presidential candidate Luis Carlos Galán and part of a real speech he gave:

"We're changing the Colombian people's consciousness...so that never again will any Colombian feel ashamed when he shows his country's passport."

 

The show focuses on some of Colombia's worst historical moments, but it provides so much historical context that it really helps people understand what the country went through and the incredible corrupting power of drug money. It really makes one think: what if this had been your country?

Bandidos Mortos: Which Brazilians Are Condemned to Die?

In Brazil, there's a saying: "Bandido bom é bandido morto." A good criminal is a dead criminal. It's the kind of perspective that forms when under the constant threat of violent crime. Though the death penalty is banned in Brazil, killings of alleged, assumed, and accused criminals happen often. More often than not, victims of extrajudicial murders, particularly at the hands of police, are black and poor. When a white, middle class person becomes the victim, it's a different story.

This issue came to the fore this week when a man named Marco Archer became the first Brazilian national to be executed abroad. The 53-year-old convicted of drug trafficking in Indonesia died by firing squad. President Dilma Rousseff herself appealed to her Indonesian counterpart on humanitarian grounds, but her request for clemency was denied. Brazil recalled its ambassador from Jakarta, and Rousseff said there would be diplomatic consequences.

The failed appeal wasn't just an effort to save a fellow citizen. Brazil bans the death penalty, and maximum prison sentences are capped at 30 years. By law, Brazil will not extradite foreigners who will face a life sentence or a death sentence in their country of origin. In Archer's case, the Brazilian government asked for his extradition so he could serve his jail sentence in Brazil.

Archer was a confessed criminal. He was a seasoned international drug trafficker who began hauling cocaine and other drugs in the 1980s across Latin America, the United States, Europe, and Indonesia. He grew up middle class in Rio's Ipanema neighborhood, and was a professional hang glider. As he began trafficking, he became a playboy, traveling the world and living large. But at one point, he got into a bad accident while hang gliding, ending in a long recovery and expensive hospital bills. So he went on a new smuggling trip to Indonesia, where he was arrested in 2003.

In a 2005 interview with a Brazilian journalist, he proudly said: "I've never paid income taxes, I've never had a checkbook, I never served in the army. I only voted once in my life, for Collor, a family friend." On his storied trafficking career, he said: "I've never had another job in my life."

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The execution has divided Brazilians. Some say he deserved it, along the lines of bandido bom, bandido morto school of thought. Others have expressed outrage from a human rights perspective. Amnesty International Brazil Executive Director Atila Roque told Reuters:

"The impression that Indonesia is giving to the world is that the country is moving backwards, that it is decidedly willing to disrespect something which is so important for the world today. The world is moving forwards in reducing, suspending and halting the executions, and Indonesia is saying 'no.'"

Meanwhile, Brazilian writer Alex Castro wrote on Facebook:

"Dear Brazilian drug trafficker...do the exact same thing in Indonesia that you do in Rio's favelas or the outskirts of São Paulo, and get executed by the Indonesian government after a trial, instead of summarily, in the street, by a Brazilian military policeman. (Ah, to be Carioca, white, middle class; having a cool profession also helps. Avoid being black at all costs!)"

While Brazilian law prohibits the death penalty, in reality executions by state agents are common in Brazil. Between 2009 and 2013, over 11,000 Brazilians were killed by police, according to the Forum Brasileira de Segurança Pública. Last year, killings by police rose 30 percent in Rio de Janeiro, and nearly 29 percent in São Paulo. On average, police kill six people each day.

Black Brazilians are much more likely to be executed by police. In general, nearly three-quarters of Brazilian homicide victims are black. And in São Paulo, for example, police kill blacks at a rate three times higher than of whites.

Youth are often targets. One particularly terrible case happened this month in Rio de Janeiro. Patrick Ferreira Queiroz, age 11, was shot three times in the back by police during an alleged shoot-out with drug traffickers in the North Zone favela where the boy lived. Military police, part of the local "pacification" unit, claim Patrick was armed, and said they found drugs and a gun in his belongings. His father denies he had a gun, and his cousin said she witnessed police targeting and executing him, shooting him multiple times at close range. Police had detained Patrick a week before his death on suspicion of working for drug traffickers, but he wasn't charged and was released. One of Patrick's older brothers had also been recently detained for alleged ties to trafficking. Patrick had dropped out of school six months earlier, and was reportedly working at a local café.

Patrick was buried the day he would have turned 12. The shooting is now under investigation.

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In 2008, one of Brazil's most famous actors starred in a movie called "Meu Nome Não É Johnny." It's based on the true story of a white, upper-middle-class Carioca who became a drug trafficker, got caught, and was given a minimal jail sentence of two years, during which time he redeemed himself and got his life back on track. It's a vivid example of the vast differences in how judicial systems treat white and black drug offenders, as well as wealthy and poor offenders.

A documentary on Archer's life is already in the works. But don't expect a movie about Patrick any time soon.

Five Dilemmas of Rio's Pacification Strategy

As troops stormed Rio's Maré favela on Sunday to prepare to install a permanent police presence as a part of the city's security strategy, the so-called pacification program is coming under increasing scrutiny.

The program, which began in 2008, installs permanent police stations in the city's favelas in a bid to impose a state presence where there previously had been none. Around 174 communities have been "pacified" so far.

But recently, the cracks have begun to show more clearly and the illusion of peace has frayed. In 2014, four military police have been killed in pacified favelas. And last week, three pacification police officers were shot in several pacified communities, with attacks in three different favelas. One pacification station was destroyed. Reports of shoot-outs in Rocinha, Complexo de Alemão, and Pavão-Pavãozinho have once again become more common.

The Rio government has made this out to be a black and white issue involving the city's drug traffickers. Governor Sérgio Cabral said the recent attacks were an attempt by traffickers to "weaken the victorious policy of pacification that has retaken territories historically occupied by criminals to control public power." Rio Security Secretary José Beltrame commented that one of the trafficking groups, the Red Command, "is finding itself trapped, with much less territory than it had eight years ago. Of course it's going to react."

But the truth is more complex.

I've compiled some of the issues that are at play in the city's pacification strategy, including long-term challenges.

1. The branding of the strategy reveals exactly what's missing from it.

The strategy is called pacification, and the permanent police stations are called police pacification units, or UPPs. While there's an element of peace in this concept, it has to do with power and violence, and not with development or the vast majority of people living in the favelas. Inclusion is an afterthought.

Pacification was also designed leading up to the city's mega-events, and given the city's bad rep, it was an appealing sell to the international media. In its own way, the branding of the pacification strategy speaks to a Don Draper philosophy: if you don't like what's being said, change the conversation.

2. Pacification has so far failed to integrate communities into the city, because the focus has been on eliminating people rather than empowering them.

So far, the pacification strategy has sought to bring areas of the city under state control. The focus has been to establish a police presence and in theory, chase out, capture, or kill drug traffickers. While at the beginning, there were promises of social services and social programs through UPP Social, these promises have largely failed to materialize. Many pacified favelas have yet to get connected to the city's sanitation system, or even the water system, or to see any new schools or hospitals built.

One reason behind this has to do with bureaucracy and the number of state agencies involved; the other is that the government has preferred flashy infrastructure projects with questionable impact, including cable cars in Alemão and Rocinha. The one in Rocinha, which has yet to be built, is estimated at R$1.6 billion, while the community still has no sanitation and sewage flows openly through the community's streets. It's easier to cut a ribbon on a cable car than a collection of underground pipes.

3. While the public sector has failed to treat favela residents as citizens, the private sector has stepped in to treat them like consumers.

One of the biggest misconceptions about favelas is that they are groups of precarious, ramshackle shanties for the city's poorest. In some cases, that's true, but favelas are also huge communities of permanent homes for the city's growing new middle class. Data Popular, which studies this group of consumers, estimates that 65 percent of Brazil's favela residents belong to the new middle class.

Even though residents are improving their quality of life through better education, higher salaries, and access to consumer goods, the government hasn't done its part to provide the services that citizens require, such as health and education. Members of these communities are among those Brazilians who became consumers, but not citizens in the country's social transformation, as Brazilian philosopher Vladimir Safatle once said.

Meanwhile, the private sector has taken notice. When police first arrive to occupy a favela, businesses notoriously follow the next day, including satellite and cable TV providers. Electronics stores, banks, and other businesses have followed. Last year, plans were announced to build the first favela mall, in the Complexo de Alemão.

4. Pacification hasn't been a silver bullet to prevent violence.

In pacified favelas, homicides are down, but disappearances are up. The murder rate overall has been declining in both Rio state and city, as well as in pacified favelas. But these same communities have also seen a spike in disappearances as efforts are made to hide homicides.

And while some would like to attribute the pacification strategy to the state's decline in homicides, the truth is that the Rio murder rate has generally been falling since the mid-90s. Meanwhile, in the short term, homicides have been going up, as the state's latest numbers for January 2014 show. Citywide, violent crimes have been on the uptick in the past year.

5. The actors haven't changed.

This, I think, is the most important factor. Pacification hasn't replaced that actors reponsible for perpetuating this decades-old conflict; it's simply made for faster turnover and more regular contact.

Some recent examples show exactly how that's possible.

Today, federal police arrested five military police stationed in Rocinha's pacification unit. They stand accused of providing intel to the favela's drug traffickers, giving details about ongoing investigations and upcoming operations. Considering that police have traditionally been one of the providers of weapons in favelas, it's not unimaginable that this case of police working with traffickers even after pacification is an isolated incident. Meanwhile, the preliminary investigation into the recent attack on Alemão is looking at an alliance of drug traffickers and community leaders who want to retake control of the favela. 

One of the most controversial aspects of pacification is whether it has really managed to rid favelas of drug traffickers, and the short answer is that it hasn't. While in some cases traffickers have become less visible, they're very much still there. In November, over a year after it was pacified, Rocinha was still moving up to R$10 million worth of drugs every month.

And all this doesn't even bring into account the city's militias, which have prospered in areas that remain unpacified.

The big question is how to change the actors. But for that, too, there's no silver bullet solution.

Image: Rio's Borel favela in 2010. The sign reads: Rio de Janeiro, 2016: an integrated city. Flickr/Secretaria de Assistência Social e Direitos Humanos.

Favela Surveillance in Rio

In a bit of news that made only a small blip in the Brazilian media and virtually no impact in the international media, the special forces in Rio, known as BOPE, began testing drones over favelas citywide. Called UAVs in English and VANTS in Portuguese, the vehicles are being used to monitor drug trafficking groups and are also to experiment with a new security technique ahead of the upcoming mega-events. The military says this type of surveillance could save lives by avoiding fire from traffickers.

Mercopress reports:

So far three VANTS are on test surveillance and in the near future could be used for several tasks including monitoring and support operations in many of the favelas which remain under control or threat from the drug-related gangs that hide among the impoverished residents.

Folha spoke to the head of the project, Major Jacy Montenegro Magalhães Neto:

"You send soldiers into a favela, in alleys and back streets, and they can suffer an ambush...when you send the VANT ahead, it sees things the soldiers don't see. We think of the VANT as a way to save lives [of the soldiers]."

Earlier this year, the army began using high-definition cameras in a number of pacified favelas, both on the ground and from the air. An important advantage to using them on the ground was to provide more transparency following complaints from community members of abuses by the armed forces.

Rio Grande do Sul will also see the use of drones for public security, Folha reported. The state previosuly tested VANTS during large soccer games in 2010. There will also be drones on parts of Brazil's borders. Last week, Embraer announced a $1 billion project using VANTS on the border with Bolivia and Paraguay.

Photo: QinetiQ Group

Occupying Rocinha

Early this morning, 3,000 police and soldiers arrived in Rocinha, the biggest slum in Rio, all of Brazil, and even Latin America, to begin the process of pacification. They arrived heavily armed, some in armored tanks. By the afternoon, troops hoisted the state and national flags, declaring the favela under state control. The massive operation met no resistance, and not a single shot was fired.

As some predicted, the occupation was peaceful. Rocinha, after all, does suffer from violence, but less in comparison to other favelas, notably Complexo do Alemão, which is known as Rio's "Gaza Strip." Rocinha is also a place constantly frequented by outsiders: Cariocas from around the city for funk parties, foreigners and Cariocas working for local NGOs, and tourists. Since the initial occupation was mostly uneventful, it left many wondering why such a massive operation with such intensive media coverage was necessary.

The name of the operation itself seemed an oxymoron: Operação Choque de Paz, or Operation Shock of Peace. It was hardly a shock, given that the occupation was announced well in advance and everyone knew it was coming, and wasn't so much of a military "shock" given the lack of violence. While the capture of Rocinha's top drug trafficker helped avoid a clash during the occupation, other traffickers had time to flee. Since several police officers and traffickers were arrested "escorting" some of the traffickers during Nem's failed escape, it's likely other drug traffickers had ample time to leave Rocinha before the occupation. (In the past, though, some of the traffickers simply moved out of newly pacified favelas into other favelas.) Conspiracy theorists even speculated if the state government made a deal with traffickers to leave before the operation.

A PR success for the Rio government

Security forces encountered no resistance from traffickers, except for trash left blocking some streets and oil poured on the roads in Rocinha and Vidigal (a nearby favela that was also occupied) intended to make the streets slippery. By announcing the massive operation ahead of time and raising the possibility of clashes between traffickers and police, the state government guaranteed its success with the eventual absence of violence by exceeding expectations. Also, by demonstrating a show of force, the state government also gave Rio's middle and upper classes, as well as the foreign community de olho before the World Cup and Olympics, a sign that it's serious about combatting crime and imposing order.

Those responsible for the operation made sure to not only overprepare, but also to publicize preparations. In doing so, the occupation woud already be more successful than the bloody Alemão occupation. The government set up a temporary hospital right outside the favela (based on the MINUSTAH model from Haiti), with other hospitals and ambulances on standby, and shut down traffic near the favela. They also published the transportation and medical parts of the plan on a map prior to the operation.

Government planners also made sure to publicize the "show of force." BOPE, Rio's special ops team, published a photo on Twitter of Security Secretary José Mariano Beltrame speaking to troops before the operation, in what seemed like a scene from Tropa de Elite. BOPE also posted photos on Twitter from the operation itself. The operation brought armored tanks, trucks, and helicopters to the favela. The tanks arrived by coming through Leblon, one of Rio's wealthiest neighborhoods (photos here and video here), creating quite a spectacle. It's as if army tanks rolled down Park Avenue on the Upper East Side on the way to the South Bronx. It was surreal.

During the operation, police found drugs, weapons, and ammunition left by traffickers, as well as the abandoned luxury homes of head traffickers Nem and Peixe (see photos here, and more here). Police arrested at least four people, including a trafficker who'd escaped from prison and one of Nem's accountants.

A media circus?

Some speculated that the operation was created to feed a media circus. Indeed, there was tons of international coverage, as well as live blogging from Globo (here and here) with live news, videos, and photos. Many reporters had on bulletproof vests. Live TV coverage from Al Jazeera showed its Brazil correspondent in full protective gear, with a helmet and bulletproof vest. Globo also did extensive live TV coverage as the operation was underway, though it was in the early hours of the morning.

But the media's presence was better than no media coverage at all, even if it went a bit overboard. The fact that so many journalists and cameras were present for the occupation may have prevented abuses that took place during previous occupations, or even violence. In the end, there was a great deal of transparency.

Also, it wasn't just the media covering the operation. Local activists, NGOs, and residents were reporting on the events on Twitter, and continued vigilance from these groups will hopefully ensure against abuses from the police and military (or at least expose those abuses).

What now for the community?

Now that Rocinha has been "pacified," the government will officially install UPP units in Rocinha in the coming months. But until then, residents are still waiting for Rocinha to be integrated into the rest of the city. The first service being offered even prior to the occupation was cheap cable TV, but formal electric lines, water, sanitation, and internet remain to be seen. Also, improved roads, sidewalks, and transportation will be a continuing challenge. In addition, residents also hope for better public services, including schools, hospitals, and sanitation.

Al Jazeera released an interesting report today on the UPP program worth watching that sums up both the good and the bad of the program, and what to expect as more UPPs are created.

 

Also see - Security in Rio: Stranger than Fiction 

Security in Rio: Stranger Than Fiction

Elite Squad 2 will be released in the U.S. on November 11th, and those unfamiliar with the plot may think it's just a creative screenplay. But in reality, much of the story is based on fact, because in Rio, truth is often stranger than fiction.

There's been quite a few big news stories on Rio security in the past two weeks, but not everything is exactly as it seems.

Local politician "in exile:" Marcelo Freixo flees Rio

Last week, popular Rio Congressman Marcelo Freixo announced that he was fleeing Brazil after death threats from Rio militias escalated. He found little support for increased security from the Rio authorities, who he claims have failed to investigate the threats against him. Some were even calling his abrupt departure as "exile." Freixo inspired the character Diogo Fraga in Elite Squad 2, since in real life, he has been going after Rio's militias and politicians with militia ties since 2006. He's made many enemies, including a former policeman/militia member who escaped from prison and was allegedly offered R$400,000 to murder Freixo.

But here's the catch. Freixo and his family left the country and went to Europe with the support of Amnesty International, and Freixo will be giving several speeches in conjunction with Amnesty while he's gone. He also announced that he would only be gone for several weeks before returning to Rio.

So in reality, he wasn't really going into exile, but taking a leave of absence. On the one hand, making the big deal out of it that he did helped put more pressure on the Rio government to investigate the threats against him and provide more security, especially considering that a Rio judge was brazenly murdered less than three months ago by the same groups that are after Freixo. Considering his life is in danger, he helped frame his departure in a more dramatic fashion in a sort of last ditch attempt for more protection.

On the other hand, it was a bit of a PR ploy to make the mayor and governor look bad, which is convenient considering that Freixo will likely run for mayor next year. It also was something of a slap in the face to José Mariano Beltrame, Security Secretary for Rio state. Granted, Beltrame has one of the most difficult jobs in the city, if not Brazil, but Freixo's so-called "exile" did not do him any favors.

In the end, Freixo is an honest guy working to make the city safer, so hopefully his brief European break will in fact end up helping him get better protection when he gets back, as well as inspiring renewed vigor amongst Cariocas to combat the militias.

Sambando for security: Mangueira pacification unit established

Last week, the Mangueira favela was the latest to receive an UPP, a pacification force of police intended to impose order and drive out drug traffickers. The community of 20,000 is a key component of the government's pacification plan, since it's located near Maracanã Stadium and has a samba school popular with tourists and Cariocas alike. The pacification unit was inaugurated amongst much fanfare, including music performances with samba dancers and a speech by the governor, but few residents attended. Along with supposed greater safety, the Mangueira UPP plan also includes discounted cable TV for all residents and trash collection by city services, which it didn't have before. The day after the UPP was installed, Mayor Eduardo Paes spoke with residents, and he said:

"The idea is to 'New York-ize' Mangueira. Except Mangueira is much better than New York. Here, for example, you have the samba school. Trash collection will be done twice a day, Monday to Saturday, with new machines. That's more frequently than in Leblon [a wealthy neighborhood], where it's done only once a day, three times a week."

While some residents are hoping for improvements, many are still waiting on a number of requests, including better schools, improved water services, better sewage management, more jobs, and more tourism. Whether the UPP will be able to eliminate the drug trade is unclear, since other UPPs have been unsuccessful in that regard. Since violence in this favela is seemingly more "visible" to foreigners (and to Cariocas from other parts of the city), more so than somewhere like Maré, which is also slated for pacification, it will be interesting to see if further improvements are made, or if much of this particular UPP is só para inglês ver.

Cameraman killed during police operation

Gelson Domingos, a cameraman from Band TV, was killed while filming a police operation in the Antares favela in Rio on Sunday. He was wearing a bulletproof vest, but was hit with a bullet from an assault rifle that went through the protective layer. As Julia Michaels points out on RioReal, the Zona Oeste has only one pacified favela, but even so, the UPP strategy and its short term success may have created an "exaggerated sense of safety," so that the cameraman's murder was more of a shock. The West Zone has seen more violence recently as traffickers and militia vie for control: an elementary school in Bangu was invaded by traffickers fleeing police last week, and as Michaels also pointed out, murders are on the rise in nearby Vila Kennedy.

The case served as a somber reminder of the city's ongoing struggle to combat violent crime, after a period of time with no high-profile deaths (the last was Judge Acioli several months ago). It was also sobering for veteran journalists, since Domingos was remembered as an experienced cameraman who frequently covered dangerous stories.

Tweaking the numbers: murder statistics under debate

Recent statistics from the Rio government showed falling murder rates, but an economist from the Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada (Ipea) looked at the numbers and claims they don't add up. He found that deaths without a determined cause of death--even violent ones that were clearly murders--weren't being counted as homicides. By his estimates, there were nearly 63 percent more murders in 2009 than the official statistics show. Other experts expressed support for Ipea's observations, and the Secretaries of Health and Security agreed to change how they collect data.

Top drug trafficker arrested as police prepare Rocinha for pacification

The Rio state government is preparing for one of its largest military operations in history: it plans to install a pacification unit in Rocinha, the largest favela in Rio and in the entire country. Rocinha is a city within a city: with nearly 70,000 inhabitants, it has more people than 92 percent of Brazilian cities. The occupation will be difficult, and authorities are hoping to use a different strategy to avoid a repeat of pacifying Complexo do Alemão, when over 30 people were killed. But successfully pacifying Rocinha will not only be a major success for public security in Rio and the UPP program, but is also a goal of the state government before the Rio +20 next year, the Confederations Cup and the pope's visit the following year, and then the World Cup and Olympics.

In preparation for the military invasion this weekend, last night police finally caught the most powerful drug trafficker in Rocinha, who was hidden in the trunk of a car bound for São Paulo. One of the men in the car claimed to be a Congolese consular officer, and alleged he had diplomatic immunity (police later found no evidence that he was actually from the Congo). Nem offered police a R$1 million bribe, which they refused. (For perspective, Nem typically makes US$5 million a month.)

Nem is a peculiar guy, practically a character out of a bad action flick. He paid taxes in 2009, even though he was being hunted by police. In 2010, he faked his own death and funeral to try to trick the police. Last year, he invaded the Intercontinental Hotel in São Conrado with other traffickers and held hostages for several hours before escaping. According to The New York Times, he used to wear expensive suits and take his wife on a rented helicopter to tour the city. Before it was discovered by police, Nem's home was essentially a luxury condo hidden in the favela. He had plastic surgery to avoid being recognized. After his arrest, he called his mother and told her to make sure his children didn't miss school. In an interview published on November 11th, he claimed he doesn't do drugs, said that former President Lula is his idol, and professed his admiration for security chief Beltrame.

So why, after all this time, were cops able to nab the elusive Nem? Above all, he had paid police protection that allowed him to allude authorities for years. But last night, there was a breakthrough. First, the Federal Police (the equivalent of the FBI), arrested ten police officers and drug traffickers that were "escorting" Nem and other traffickers as they quietly fled the favela. The group was paid R$2 million to help the traffickers escape. Second, police were closely monitoring cars leaving the favela, and members of the "shock battalion" of the military police were the ones who spotted the suspicious vehicle and pulled it over in nearby Gávea. Third, the police refused Nem's bribe.

Nem has been cooperating with the authorities, and has provided them with information that could potentially root out even more corrupt cops. He told investigators he was making R$100 million (US$57.3 million) a year, but that 50 percent of his income was used to pay off civil and military police. While the initial preparations for pacification were a success, many are holding their breath for the actual "invasion" this weekend. According to a local crime reporter, because of the recent murder of the TV cameraman, security officials will likely not allow much press coverage, making it "one of the least transparent UPP operations" so far. The city is shutting down airspace over Rocinha on Sunday, and forces will likely include the army, military police, and BOPE. Time will tell if Beltrame and his team have determined the least violent way to send in the pacification force.

Hopefully, the occupation won't be movie-worthy material.

Drug Liberalization in Brazil

In a country where major cities are plagued by organized crime and drug trafficking, it's no surprise that a liberalization movement has grown and has gained a steady foothold among urban youth and intellectuals. Just in the past year, two documentaries were released about drug policy, including Quebrando O Tabú, featuring former president Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Bill Clinton, Jimmy Carter, and Paulo Coelho, and Cortina de Fumaça, which also includes FHC, Fernando Gabeira, and dozens of experts in Brazil and abroad.

More videos from Quebrando O Tabú

Cortina de Fumaça is currently showing at the Petrobras Brazil Film Festival in New York, which I was lucky enough to see early this week. If you can't make it to the next screening, you can watch here:

But here's the catch: in Brazil, it's illegal to publicly protest drug policy, since it's illegal to "apologize for" or defend crime and illegal substances. In the past, drug liberalization marches, known as Marchas da Maconha (Marijuana Marches) were broken up by police, and protesters arrested.

Most recently, there was a march in São Paulo in May, which was violently repressed by police after the event was forbidden by local courts. In fact, the same month, Marijuana Marches were prohibited by the courts in nine cities. To protest the repression of the São Paulo march, a week later, thousands of people (somewhere between 2,000 and 5,000) took to the streets of Brazil's largest city in what they called the Marcha da Liberdade, or the Freedom March.

 

The Freedom March inspired planning for new marches throughout Brazil, but there was some question as to how they would take place given past events. Some events, like the Rio de Janeiro march, were calling it the Marcha da Liberdade instead of the Marcha da Maconha, both to protest censorship and to attempt to ensure the event could take place. But today, the Supreme Court ruled in a unanimous decision that protesters will be able to hold Marijuana Marches, declaring that the protests were not defending drug trafficking. The justices defended the protesters' freedom of speech, explaining that it was their constitutional right to express their views.

Now, this weekend, marches are planned all over Brazil, including massive events in São Paulo and Rio, as well as events in more than 30 other cities.

 

This will be a very interesting movement to watch, because though it seems unlikely that major legislation will come anytime soon, it's an issue that is gaining momentum and has the support of some powerful and influential people, from TV stars to the ex-president. It's possible that this issue will become a more salient, national debate in the near future.