One of the big challenges for Rio de Janeiro in the next few years is to bring crime under control. As the Rio government continues to install pacification units in the city's favelas, taking areas by force that were previously controlled by drug traffickers and militias, it still begs to question whether the strategy is effectively tackling the type of crime that effects Cariocas in their day to day lives.
The Rio state government has aggressively pursued the UPP strategy using both military and PR tactics to establish state control in the city's slums. The show of force in some of the city's most dangerous neighborhoods is the cornerstone of Governor Sérgio Cabral's plan to reduce violence in the city. In theory, imposing control in areas were crime allegedly originates should reduce the murders, muggings, robberies, carjackings, and other crimes that continue terrorize the city. So is it working?
According to some of the official numbers, possibly. Murder rates went down 18 percent in 2010, and supposedly muggings have been reduced, though like in this article, the numbers are missing. (The article only cites one neighborhood, Tijuca, where homicides and car robberies have been reduced by half). Numbers released earlier in the year showed declines in violent crimes from the year before, and the trends appear to continue. This month, the government released new numbers about crime reduction, comparing numbers from April 2010 to numbers from April 2011. There was a 16 percent reduction in car thefts, a 15 percent reduction in muggings, and a 7 percent decrease in murders, as well as a reduction in violent crimes.
But if you take a look at the ISP's raw data, it does seem possible that these numbers are not all-encompassing, and it's very likely that crimes like muggings and theft are underreported. Meanwhile, if you examine murder rates, they seem like a trickier barometer for measuring the success of recent public security measures. That's because if you look at national data, like from the Mapa da Violência, it shows that murder rates in Brazilian capitals having been declining, in particular from 2003 to 2008 (while they increased in rural areas). In reality, murder rates in Rio have been declining since the late 90s, before Cabral took office in 2007. In 1998, Rio de Janeiro state had the third highest murder rate in the country with 55.3 murders per 100,000, and in 2008 moved down to the seventh highest murder rate with 34 murders per 100,000 in the state. While the city of Rio de Janeiro had the fifth highest murder rate in Brazil in 1998, with 62.6 murders per 100,000, the numbers were reduced by half to 31 per 100,000 in 2008, putting the city in 20th place as one of the state capitals with some of the least murders capita. In fact, in 2008, there were fewer murders per capita in Rio than in Brasília, Curitiba, Belo Horizonte and Porto Alegre. (For these numbers, download the Sumário Executivo) Did recent security policies help contribute to these numbers? Or are other forces at play - or both?
Despite reductions in homicide rates, crimes like muggings and armed robbery continue to plague the city. Though the media has toned down a bit in terms of sensationalizing crime in the last few years, it's still hard to avoid -- every day, there's a disconcerting story, even if it's buried on the fifth page of the paper. Though the city is well on its way to becoming a global capital, these types of crimes still seem to be the norm.
Tourists, obviously, are still easy targets: last week, a group of Canadian and Australian documentary filmmakers were mugged in Santa Teresa by two men with a knife, and all of their equipment was stolen. (Note to foreigners interested in filming in Rio: it's not the best idea to walk around Santa Teresa at night in general, let alone with expensive cameras). Also last week, a 24 year-old French tourist was taking the bondinho (street car) from Centro to Santa Teresa, and leaned out too far to take a photo and fell from the top of Arcos da Lapa. (I've witnessed accidents in the same place before, though not fatal) The protective netting lining the arches precisely to protect people from falling broke, and the man was killed nearly instantly. But while he lay dying on the ground, eyewitnesses claim street kids robbed the tourist's camera and belongings.
But Cariocas themselves are all too often the victims of crime, and no one is exempt - young, old, famous, powerful, armed, defenseless - anyone can be a target. This weekend, for example, two armed men forced their way into an apartment building in Ipanema, where they broke into the apartment of the national Minister of Defense's son. He and his wife were held at gunpoint while the men stole R$500 and jewelery, and they were luckily unharmed. Police are investigating as to why the criminals targeted only Jobim's son's apartment. The governor himself was the victim of an attempted robbery last week, when several men tried to steal a motorcycle from Cabral's motorcade. Though Cabral had left by helicopter minutes before, his security guards exchanged heavy fire with the criminals. Nobody was hurt, but the would-be thieves escaped.
It's no coincidence that Cabral hired Rudy Giuliani as a public security consultant for the upcoming World Cup and Olympics; the former New York City mayor helped reduce crime rates with his "zero tolerance" approach. But the big question is if the UPP strategy and current public security measures will have a long term impact on crime rates that affect the daily quality of life for Cariocas, and if those changes are sustainable. For the wealthy, it's natural to invest in armored cars, electrified fences, and armed security guards. But more investment is needed in public security policies beyond the favelas, particularly in beefing up police presence around the city, and ensuring that police themselves are well-trained, better paid, and acting in the best interests of the populace. There's no doubt that the city will be a very safe place during the World Cup and the Olympics, but the goal of attaining the same level of security well before and long after the city's big events is still far off.
I live in Meier, in the Zona Norte. Here, things have gotten progressively worse, as the UPPs that comprise the "security perimeter" (largely in the South and Center Zones) have driven traficantes into the UPP-free comunidades deeper into the North and West Zones.
If you look at homicide statistics for towns in the Lakes Region, you'll notice they, along with petty theft, carjackings, and violent assault - have gone up. As have homicides in the Northeast, where some traficantes have made their way.
Drug-related crime and violence is no longer a problem endemic to the city of Rio de Janeiro. If the short-sighted policies of Beltrame and Paes continue, conditions may improve in Rio, but this will be at the expense of the security of the rest of the RM, state, and country.
Posted by: Micaela | June 30, 2011 at 07:43 PM
In and around Penha things have gotten "safer" since the military invasion last year. Even though the troops walking and driving around leave me feeling rather uncomfortable, they have been keeping things calm enough that you see more people out in the streets walking and running in the morning and out at night than I remember seeing in a long time.
I think most people in the neighborhood would agree that less violent crime in the areas surrounding the favelas, especially mugging, has increased since November as the bandidos look for other forms of income, but voilent and gang realted crime is definitely down. In the last two months I have heard tiro only once. It used to be a nightly occassion and sometimes even happened during the day making it impossible to leave the house.
I would much rather lose my cellphone than be hit by a stray bullet and I prefer hearing about people loosing some cash to hearing about them losing their lives, so I'd say the change has been for the better even though there is still a lot of room for improvement. Judging by the huge number of people who seem to be moving back to Leopoldinha (penha, bonsucesso, ramos, olaria)I don't think I'm in the minority on this.
Posted by: Nicole | July 01, 2011 at 09:22 AM
I would also add that there is a potential downward bias in any homicide statistic published by a government organization or government affiliate: they do not include the nearly 25,000 people on the city's registry of missing people. I would be interested in seeing a re purposed homicide statistic for Rio that includes those reported "missing" (read: quite possibly killed by police, BOPE, milicia, or traficantes). I'm not sure Rio would come out ahead of any other capital, should these "missing" be included in the data.
Posted by: Micaela | July 01, 2011 at 11:00 AM
Excellent points Micaela. Thanks for the insight.
Posted by: Rio Gringa | July 01, 2011 at 03:53 PM
Nicole, I agree...mostly.
I used to work in the Complexo do Alemao (which I accessed via Penha/Ramos) in the pre-occupation days. I have since heard that the incidence of violent crime in those neighborhoods is indeed down. The problem is, the improvements are occurring in a select few "security poles" around the city, namely, neighborhoods with nearby UPPs, neighborhoods lying within the mega-event "security belt" and the Complexo (post-police occupation). BUT, when you consider what other areas of the city are experiencing - such as the militia-dominated Zona Oeste neighborhoods such as Cosmos - it's hard to have a positive outlook. In many areas, the milicia have filled security vacuums left by traficantes who were driven out by the PMs, and routinely threaten residents with violence, extort exorbitant fees for "security" and utility provision, and impose strict sanctions on neighborhood residents. It's hard to make the argument that traficantes are "better" than the milicia, or vice versa, but to me, nothing is more terrifying than not knowing your enemy. The milicia are a shadowy parallel power, and it's nearly impossible to ID them and bring them to justice for a number of reasons, with fear being reason #1. At least with the traficantes, one knows who they are, where they live, and how they operate. The enemy you don't know, to me, is more terrifying than the one you do.
The UPPs will not be a sustainable solution. A grim cost-benefit analysis aside, you don't have to dig very deep to discover that violent crime, trafficking, and homicide is still occurring in comundidades in which UPPs have been installed. Even O Globo features weekly articles on the violence that continues to plague communities with UPP, so you know everything Globo says is just the tip of the iceberg. In the past ten days, violent assualts and a military-style execution were reported in Prazeres and Cantagalo, respectively. Go into Dona Marta, Nova Brasilia, Borel, wherever, and you'll hear (off the record) that traficantes are still there. The ones that aren't have simply moved to other areas (like the 8 ex-Mangueira traficantes that were killed this past Sunday in a police operation in the West Zone).
The media does an excellent job of making the average Carioca think that Beltrame's tactics are a resounding success. But dig a little deeper, and you'll find the truth is not quite as rosy.
Posted by: Micaela | July 01, 2011 at 05:21 PM