Hostile Takeover

As promised, here is part II on the Rio violence that took place during the last week of November, and some observations about what happened.

When you take a look at the order of events, it seems to mirror a series of attacks that took place in Sao Paulo in 2006, as organized crime groups defied police and terrified the populace by setting fire to vehicles and attacking police stations. Though there were two times as many deaths in the Sao Paulo attacks, the events in Rio served as a turning point in its civil war.

The attacks, which were originally reported as coming from orders from prisoners in a maximum security prison in Parana, were then supposedly all being organized and commanded by drug traffickers in Complexo de Alemao. The reasoning behind the attacks was allegedly to undermine police pacification efforts in the UPPs in several Rio favelas, which are meant to combat drug trafficking and violence and for the police to win the confidence of local residents. But the attacks weren't just directly against the police; they were generalized "terrorist" attacks in a gruesome display of power all over the city:

Thus the first component of the week of violence: a power struggle. The UPPs have had some success so far, but those closely following their progress claim there is still a long way to go before declaring victory. Also, more key favelas remain to be integrated into the project, including Rocinha and Vidigal, two of the city's largest slums. Though drug trafficking has hardly come to a standstill because of the UPPs, drug traffickers have been losing ground to the police in key areas of the city, and though the police still are not beloved by all (to put it mildly), they are managing to gain more trust from locals as drug traffickers, who traditionally provided services to residents, are being edged out. This is an ongoing struggle, as a part of Rio's so-called civil war. But these attacks were meant to show the ability of organized crime to take over the city, a prospect so terrifying that it practically paralyzed the city for a few days. But the backlash by the police and army was meant to send a clear message: drug traffickers don't stand a chance when the government actually puts its foot down and sends in the troops. This struggle between traffickers and police is far from over, so this power struggle will continue to manifest itself, though hopefully not on a city-wide scale again.

The other component of the events was the dynamic of good guy vs bad guy, which is usually much more ambiguous. Because Cariocas were so terrified by the week's events, they were more than happy to see the police invading the favelas and using a show of force against the drug traffickers. Though the civil and military police have historically been as much a part of the problem as the drug traffickers in contributing to Rio's woes, the week of terror transformed them into the good guys in the eyes of those outside of the favelas. Normally, Brazilians are wary of these types of policemen; according to a recent study, around a quarter of Brazilians have no trust in civil and military police, while around 44 percent have little trust. But last week, that changed, at least temporarily, as some Cariocas called for blood and gleefully watched as the police arrested and killed traffickers. But those living in the favelas saw that things hadn't changed overnight. Complaints began pouring in that cops had invaded and destroyed property in innocent people's homes, and some even complained that the police robbed them, including money and electronics. More on good guys vs bad guys: an interesting op ed on this subject from Yahoo! Brazil.

According to some analysts, both the UPPs and last week's favela takeover are largely só para inglês ver, in other words, to show outsiders that Rio is taking concrete steps to improve public safety, especially in light of the upcoming Olympics and World Cup. While I agree to some extent, I'd argue that last week's events were also para Carioca ver, showing that when under pressure, the government finally took action that could have been taken long ago (namely, arresting the main traffickers in Complexo de Alemao and establishing a government presence within the favela). The powers that be realized that if they didn't do something on a large enough scale, the situation would become untenable. As far as pleasing foreigners goes, I'd say that in theory, it was intended to be a positive PR move to inspire confidence, but it essentially just scared people even more. Talking to those unfamiliar with Rio realities, they just seemed to take in the parts about the violence, and not so much about the military takeover. Plus, the pictures were enough to scare even intrepid travelers:

Photos

Globo Album 1

Globo Album 2

Yahoo

Boston Globe

Nao Salvo

Though it would make sense to tackle Rio's problems in order to better serve its residents, time will tell to see how this pacification strategy plays out, especially as 2014 grows nearer.

The other component of the week of violence was the concept of reality vs fantasy, as Cariocas outside of the affected areas and Brazilians from other states interpreted the events taking place as they might with movies, like Tropa de Elite. An unfortunate result of this popular film and its recent sequel is that it has made Rio violence into something of a national spectacle, though the mainstream media had also done the same thing to some extent. In some cases, it was old fashioned voyeurism, in which a young favela resident and citizen journalist began documenting what was happening in the Complexo de Alemao favela on Twitter and became an overnight celebrity. Comedy blogger Kibe Loco posted a series of photos satirizing the events, pointing out that the police and military declared victory of defeating the traffickers and assuming control of the favela on top a building that is actually being constructed by the federal government. In Rio, street merchants started selling DVDs called "Terror in Rio 2010," featuring TV clips about the recent violence. One seller told the media, "O povo adora ver desgraça." [People love seeing tragedy] Meanwhile, someone created a flash game called "Fuga da Vila Cruzeiro," where the player tries to shoot down the drug traffickers fleeing the Vila Cruzeiro favela. The game has been played over 300,000 times since its release on November 29th.

Reactions by analysts were generally the same: the government is making progress, but it is not nearly enough. The Economist compared Rio's violence problems to a beautiful woman with rotting teeth, and filmmaker Jose Padilha discussed the many issues that remain to be tackled, claiming that while UPPs are a viable medicine, they ignore the root causes of the patient's disease, arguing that serious reforms are still needed. Blogger Julia Michaels has a series of excellent posts outlining the events and remaining challenges, explaining that militias are still a big problem, as well as leaving favelas outside of society and formal institutions. And security expert Luiz Eduardo Soares has an extensive op ed piece on his blog where he criticizes the media coverage of the events and emphasizes the need to reform the police.

While I agree that expanding the UPPs, reforming the police and making concrete social and economic improvements in the favelas are legitimate and positive solutions, one of the things that stood out the most about the events for me was rule of law. While many people seemed satisfied with the arrests of drug traffickers and seizures of drugs and contraband, not many seemed to realize that some of the arrested criminals are getting sent to the exact same maximum security prison where the original attack orders were made via cell phone. The holes in the system from these events are obvious, between the Parana prison security and the military police ransacking people's homes. But it goes far beyond that, and a major reform of the judicial and penitentiary systems is key in the overall approach to combatting violence in Rio. Unfortunately, though, it's not just a matter of changing laws, since rule of law is also a cultural obstacle in Rio. In the land of the jeitinho, in a city where so many people take advantage of loopholes or even flaunt rules and laws, it will require an attitude and culture shift to fully tackle these complex, deeply rooted issues. Until the law applies to everyone, until punishment is swift and just, and until everyone is entitled to security regardless of where they live, pacification will continue to be a struggle.

Comments

[carol]

"In the land of the jeitinho, in a city where so many people take advantage of loopholes or even flaunt rules and laws"
uhhm.. Eu sigo todas as leis do meu pais, pago os meus impostos e tudo mais* e nunca vi alguém buscando um "jeitinho" para se livrar de alguma situação. Aliás, para mim, "jeitinho" é uma forma de fazer algo que não ia dar certo, dar certo e não de ser desonesto, como pareceu ser na sua frase.
Não é a primeira vez que eu vejo vc associar problemas socias no Brasil a desonestidade dos brasileiros.

*em um post muito antigo vc disse que o seu namorado não pagava a tv a cabo e que o "Brasil é assim".

[Rio Gringa]

@carol the jeitinho is just to put things into perspective. i'm referring to actually breaking laws and flaunting the ability to do so, like along the lines buying drugs or paying to pass a college course. Also, I wouldn't call breaking the law "dishonesty"; there's a big difference at least in my mind. The point I was trying to make is that illegality and the necessary punishment should extend beyond the "bandidos" to the other big players in the picture (ie also militias, corrupt police officers, etc).

[Neil]

great summary!

[The Gritty Poet]

"Eu sigo todas as leis do meu pais, pago os meus impostos e tudo mais* e nunca vi alguém buscando um "jeitinho" para se livrar de alguma situação"

C'mon Carol. Either you have a very difficult time dealing with realistic observations about your country or you live in Rue du Brésil
Geneva, Switzerland.

Don't take it so personally and remember that so called first world countries like Spain, France and Italy have an even greater disregard for rules and agreements, or better yet they have great regard for them when applied to others.

[carol]

Sim, eu NUNCA vi alguém burlar leis para sair de uma situação.
Eu não tomei isso como algo pessoal, e eu me expressei mal, o que eu quis dizer é que eu não concordo que é mais necessário mudar a cultura do carioca/brasileiro do que as leis e os presidios. Não concordo com essa associação pois faz parecer que a pobreza e violencia são fruto da desonestidade das pessoas! Quando, na verdade, a violência é sempre fruto da exclusão social e é isso que o Brasil precisa mudar.
The Gritty Poet, eu sei que em meu país existem muitas pessoas que não seguem as leis, mas isso é fruto da pobreza e falta de estrutura na educação. Me desculpe, mas eu não compartilho da sua visão determinista, não acho que certas culturas são naturalmente menos seguidoras das leis.

[sheyla]

Não sei se certas culturas são menos seguidoras das leis, mas sei bem que aqui no Brasil, não seguimos leis!? É isso mesmo! A maioria ensina seus filhos a seguir mas para ter um futuro no mundo REAL tem que mudar, e isso é o que nao dá certo no Brasil. Fazemos leis para simplesmente ter o prazer de burlar. e isso acontece com uma simples carteira de identidade, que a meninada tira xerox e adultera a data de nascimento, daí platifica e TODOS os bares aceitam!!!

[The Gritty Poet]

Carol,

Since the Plano Real in 1994 the poverty rate in Brazil has dropped considerably. It is interesting to note that crime has not always followed the same declining curve. In other words there is not a direct correlation between poverty and crime.
I would venture to hypothesize that the thugs that cause havoc in the favela simply have a tendency for delinquency. Ordinary favela dwellers are as poor as they once were but do not engage is drug dealing nor torch buses, often with people inside them, when confronted.
On the other side of the crime spectrum you could look at thugs in suits, like those in congress who gladly receive kickbacks when a public works bidding process begins, hence selling their influence and defeating the purpose of the bidding process. They also sell their political platform to the highest bidder, such was the case of the mensalão scandal when the government simply decided to buy off congress instead of negociating policy. Many of these people come from well to do families but just ended up dirty: it seems dishonesty is intrinsic to their nature.
I think you are mistaken when correlating poverty to dishonesty. I have heard similar arguments based on false correlation regarding thugs in suits: it is proposed that they act that way because of money, money they have always had impeding them from being sactified by poverty. Often the same person presents both views and does not even realize they are contradictory since in one case poverty causes crime and in the other wealth causes crime. Unless one is stating that all people are criminals this does not add up.
Perhaps it would serve you well to stop correlation behavior with economic status because when you do so the conclusions are skewed plus you tend to be condescending towards the poor, as if they have no sense of personal responsibility nor individuality: they are simply a hord of people (the poor) who act uniformly out of line because they are poor.

If you, for arguments sake, do not agree that socioeconomic strata correlates to honesty or dishonesty and then look at Brazil´s standings regarding corruption then what could be attributed to the country´s terrible results? Perhaps excessive layers of bureaucracy increasing opportunities and hence probability of corruption, maybe it´s cultural as well.
I think both can be changed. I also think that people are individuals before nationalities and can choose to ignore the norm. If enough people do so then their behavior becomes the new cultural norm.

As I said before Carol I am just hypothesizing but I think it is a step up from the old "poor=saints, rich=devils" class warfare mindset that never got Brazil, nor any Latin American country, anywhere but in the hand of incompetent populists.

[Carlos]

RioGringa, this was another informative post and I thank you for all the data and links you posted on it. It's great to see that even after returning to New York (I grew up in the tri-state area and have been working in Manhattan for over a decade, so I am myself a New Yorker - I hope you're a Yankees fan, as I am! ;) ) you continue to write so prolifically about Brazil.